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Abstract
Background: The General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards
performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to
determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that
performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives.
Methods: We performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives
and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-
parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one
year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for
associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent
point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance
threshold for maximum payment.
Results: Evidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for
41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected
health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version
of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial
payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for
maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years.
Conclusions: In this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This
disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only
marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for
performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be
informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator.
Keywords: Physician incentive plans, Primary care, Quality indicators
Background
The 2004 General Medical Services (GMS) contract for
U Kp r i m a r yc a r er e p r e s e n t e dam a j o rs h i f ti nf u n d i n g
towards the use of pay for performance to incentivise
quality improvement [1]. The UK contract is currently
the world’s largest experiment in pay for performance in
primary care, currently costing £1 billion (€1.14 billion)
a year or 15% of spend on primary medical care in Eng-
land alone [2]. Similar developments are happening in
other countries including the USA [3], Canada [4],
Australia [5], New Zealand [6], Germany [7], Nether-
lands [8], and Spain [9]. Although the GMS contract
rewards general practitioners for the level of perfor-
mance, its main aim was to improve the quality of care
[2]. The pay for performance element of the GMS con-
tract was introduced in 2004 and revised in 2006, and is
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The intention of the GMS contract was to reward ‘GPs
and their staff for the volume and quality of the work
done’ [1].
There were 76 clinical indicators in the 2004 version of
the GMS contract with 550 financial points, and an addi-
tional 11 points for performing cervical screening [1].
There were 80 clinical indicators in the 2006 revisions of
the GMS contract accounting for 655 financial points.
Each point was worth £75 (€85) in 2004 rising to £124.60
(€141) from 2005 for an average sized English practice
comprising of 6411 patients and 3 full time GPs. Points
are awarded in proportion to the achieved level of the
indicator between a lower and upper limit of payment
thresholds. These payment thresholds start at a mini-
mum activity of indicated care of 25-40% rising to a max-
imum payment for 60-90% of activity. Full incentive
payment is received before all patients have received
treatment for 2 reasons. First, patients who are consid-
ered unsuitable for treatment can be exception reported.
Exception reporting is the exclusion by their doctor of
patients from receiving a specific intervention because
they have been deemed not suitable for that intervention.
Second, performance thresholds for maximum payment
are set below 100% [1].
The introduction of the QOF led to a substantial rise of
around 25% in GP principal’s incomes [10], with general
practices achieving an average of 96% of available QOF
points [11]. Critics have argued that the QOF represented
poor value for money [12] and, in particular, failed to
apply the same rigorous cost-effectiveness test applied
elsewhere in the NHS by the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [13,14]. Partly in
response to these criticisms, the UK government has
recently introduced a new process for revising the QOF,
which is informed by cost-effectiveness evidence pro-
duced by NICE [2]. This idea is not new, and linkage
between the selection of performance indicators for pri-
mary care and their potential health gain was first sug-
gested in 1992 [15]. An explicit motivation for this
process was that ‘QOF indicators should be more focused
on health outcomes and delivering health improvement
with rewards aligned to the overall health need or health
benefit’ [2]. This policy change of focusing on health out-
comes (rather than processes of care) has also been sug-
gested by other authors [16]. However, this new process
for revising QOF only goes part of the way towards
addressing cost-effectiveness concerns, since it focuses
on the selection of QOF indicators and not on the size of
the financial incentives applied to different indicators. It
is important that incentives are selected and weighted
appropriately because incentives have been shown to
change practice, and areas of care not receiving incen-
tives may be marginalised [17,18]. There is concern over
the effectiveness of P4P schemes where sustained quality
improvement may differ little from the underlying trend
[19,20].
T h eo n l yp r e v i o u ss t u d yo ft h es i z eo fi n c e n t i v e sa n d
expected health outcomes in pay for performance
schemes found that payments did not reflect likely health
gain [13]. This was a small scale study of 6 interventions
in the 2004 version of QOF, and did not include quality
adjusted life years (QALYs) as an outcome. In our paper,
we examine whether the financial incentives currently
applied to different QOF indicators are likely to be
appropriate from a cost-effectiveness perspective. Cost
effectiveness principles do not necessarily require a linear
relationship between incentive payment and health gain,
for two reasons. First, there may be a non-linear relation-
ship between the size of health gains and the size of treat-
ment costs, which also have to be taken into account in
the cost-effectiveness calculus. Second, there may be a
non-linear relationship between the size of incentive pay-
ments and the probability the indicator will be achieved.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that there
should be a positive albeit non-linear relationship
between pay and performance in terms of health gain, if
cost effectiveness principles are being appropriately
applied.
Our objective was to test in two ways the simple propo-
sition that performance indicators with larger population
health benefits receive larger financial incentives. The
first way was to examine the association between the
marginal health gained and additional incentive received
for a 1% point increase in indicator performance in a
practice operating between the minimum and maximum
thresholds for incentive payments. The second way was
to examine the association between the maximum incen-
tive payments and expected health gain from perfor-
mance at the threshold for receiving that maximum
incentive payment. We examined these associations
focusing on the incentives faced by an average sized gen-
eral practice in England with three full time practitioners
and a list size of 6411.
Methods
We performed a cross sectional analysis of the associa-
tion between the size of financial incentives and
expected health gain in English primary care in the 2004
and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Frame-
work in the following manner.
Data Collection
We obtained information on clinical indicators and
incentive payments for practices from the GMS contract
documentation. We obtained data on disease prevalence
and on exception reporting for English practices from
the NHS Information Centre [11]. We obtained data on
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Page 2 of 9estimated health gain in terms of lives saved and QALYs
using published estimates of the likely maximum
expected health gains for 28 clinical indicators which
are incentivised in the GMS contract [14,18,21]. QALY
estimates were based on lifetime QALY gains, on the
assumption that appropriate treatment will continue
beyond the current year. There are three ways in which
to express health gain in a practice population. The
‘maximum expected health gain’ is the expected number
of lives saved if all patients with the condition received
indicated care. The ‘maximum achievable health gain’ is
less, as it excludes those patients considered by their
general practitioner to be not suitable for the interven-
tion by exception reporting. For example, 13% of
patients were excluded by exception reporting from
receiving influenza immunization in 2005. The ‘incenti-
vised health gain’ is the health gain at the performance
threshold for maximum payment. This is even less as it
is the expected number of lives saved when the target
threshold for full payment is reached (for example full
incentive payment is received in influenza immunization
when 85% of eligible patients have received treatment).
Analysis
We estimated health gain for an average sized practice of
6411 patients. The data for lives saved were expressed for
an English population of 100,000 so we multiplied this by
0.06411 to reach the expected lives saved for a practice of
size 6411. Data for QALYs gained were expressed for
each patient treated, so we multiplied this figure by the
number of patients that a practice of 6411 would have
with that particular condition, using prevalence data at a
national level from English practices in QOF [21].
To calculate the marginal incentive payment for a 1%
increase in performance, the maximum total incentive
payment was divided by the percentage difference
between the upper and lower payment thresholds for
payment. To calculate the marginal health gain from a
one percentage point improvement in performance in
each indicator the maximum achievable health gain was
divided by 100. Indicator DM18 (influenza immuniza-
tion in diabetes) in 2004 is used here as a worked exam-
ple to demonstrate how marginal incentive payment and
health gain was calculated. The health gain for full
implementation of this indicator would be expected to
yield 4.1 lives saved in an average practice (Table 1).
However 13% of patients were exception reported leav-
ing a maximum number of achievable lives saved of (1-
0.13) × 4.1 which is 3.6 lives. A one percent increase in
performance would yield 0.036 of a life saved. A one per
cent increase in incentive for a practice performing
within the upper and lower payment thresholds (25% to
85%) would be the maximum payment (£225) divided
by the range (85%-25%) which is 225/60, or £3.75.
For our primary analysis, we examined the relationship
between the marginal increase in payment and health
gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in
performance for an average size general practice. For our
secondary analysis we examined the relationship between
the total payment and health gained at the performance
target for maximum payment. Histograms showed that
the data were not normally distributed; therefore a non-
parametric Spearman rank correlation test was used in
preference to a Pearson correlation test. A two-sided test
w a su s e dt ot e s tt h en u l lh y p o t h e s i so fn or e l a t i o n s h i p
between incentive payments and measures of health gain
versus the alternative hypotheses of a positive or negative
relationship. We tested this potential relationship for
both the 2004 and 2006 versions of the GMS contract,
and also for both health gain in terms of lives saved in
one year and QALYs gained.
We conducted two sensitivity analyses. First we con-
ducted a sensitivity analysis using the maximum number
of achievable lives saved as practice performance often
exceeded the upper threshold target for maximum pay-
ment. Second we included clinical indicators with evidence
for health gain that were derived from randomised con-
trolled trials only, excluding indicators with a lower
strength of evidence. All tests were carried out in SPSS
version 18.
Results
Primary analysis
Evidence for lives saved or QALYs gained was found for
28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive
payments. A full description of the clinical indicators is
given in additional file 1. For an average practice popu-
lation of 6411 the expected lives saved in one year by
each indicator range from 0.1 to 4.1 (mean 1.6, standard
deviation 1.2, Tables 1 & 2). The expected lifetime
QALYs gained ranges from 2 to 561 (mean 137, stan-
dard deviation 186). In our primary analysis in the 2004
QOF the correlation between achievable lives saved and
incentive gained from a 1% increase in performance was
not significant (Spearman’s rho 0.216, p > 0.05, Table
3). The correlation between QALYs gained and incen-
tive gained from a 1% increase in performance was also
not significant (Spearman’s rho 0.427, p > 0.05). In the
2006 QOF the correlation between achievable lives
saved and incentive gained from a 1% increase in perfor-
mance was not significant (Spearman’sr h o- 0 . 0 2 6 ,p>
0.05). The correlation between QALYs gained and
incentive gained from a 1% increase in performance was
also not significant (Spearman’s rho 0.368, p > 0.05).
Secondary and sensitivity analyses
In our secondary analysis no associations were found
between the size of financial payment for achievement
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Page 3 of 9Table 1 Quality indicators, expected health gain, and payment for performance in 2004
Quality
Indicator
label
Indicator Level of
evidence
1
Payment
thresholds
(%)
Payment
range
2
Maximum
payment
(£)
Marginal
payment
(£)
3
E-reporting
rate (%)
2005
4
Maximum
lives saved
(n)
Achievable
lives saved
(n)
Incentivised
lives saved
(n)
Maximum
QALYs
gained (n)
Achievable
QALYs
gained (n)
Incentivised
QALYs gained
(n)
1 DM 18 c 25-85 60 225 3.75 13 4.1 3.6 3.0
2 CHD 12 c 25-85 60 525 8.75 11 4 3.6 3.0
3 BP 5 rct 25-70 45 4200 93.33 5 3.1 2.9 2.1 561 533 373
4 CHD 10 rct 25-50 25 525 21.00 25 2.9 2.2 1.1 427 320 160
5 Stroke 10 c 25-85 60 150 2.50 13 1.8 1.6 1.4
6 DM 6 rct 25-50 25 1200 48.00 12 1.7 1.5 0.7
8 COPD 8 c 25-85 60 450 7.50 11 1.6 1.4 1.2
9 CHD 9 rct 25-90 65 525 8.08 4 1.6 1.5 1.4 2 2 2
11 CHD 8 rct 25-60 35 1200 34.29 10 1 0.9 0.5
12 Stroke9 rct 25-90 65 300 4.62 5 1 1.0 0.9 11 10 9
13 DM 12 c 25-55 30 1275 42.50 8 0.9 0.8 0.5
14 LVD 3 rct 25-70 45 750 16.67 7 0.8 0.7 0.5 5 5 3
15 CHD 6 rct 25-70 45 1425 31.67 4 0.7 0.7 0.5
17 Asthma 5 c 25-70 45 450 10.00 3 0.6 0.6 0.4
18 DM 7 c 25-85 60 825 13.75 6 0.4 0.4 0.3
19 BP 3 c 25-90 65 750 11.54 1 0.3 0.3 0.3
20 DM 15 rct 25-70 45 225 5.00 6 0.2 0.2 0.1 17 16 11
21 COPD 5 rct 25-90 65 450 6.92 2 0.2 0.2 0.2
22 DM 4 c 25-90 65 375 5.77 3 0.1 0.1 0.1
23 CHD 4 c 25-90 65 300 4.62 3 0.1 0.1 0.1
24 CHD 11 rct 25-70 45 525 11.67 7 0.1 0.1 0.1 2 2 1
25 Stroke4 c 25-70 45 150 3.33 4 0.1 0.1 0.1
27 CS1 c 25-80 55 825 15.00 5 71 67 54
28 DM8 c 25-90 65 375 5.77 6 115 108 97
All data for an average practice of 6411 patients, all figures rounded to whole numbers (except lives saved and marginal payment)
1 rct = randomised controlled trial, c = cohort.
2 % range of achievement between minimum and maximum payments
3 £ incentive gained for a 1% increase in performance within payment range.
4 E-reporting = exception reporting
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9Table 2 Quality indicators, expected health gain, and payment for performance in 2006
Quality
Indicator
label
Indicator Level of
evidence
1
Payment
thresholds
(%)
Payment
range
2
Maximum
payment
(£)
Marginal
payment
(£)
3
E-reporting
rate (%)
2007
4
Maximum
lives saved
(n)
Achievable
lives saved
(n)
Incentivised
lives saved
(n)
Maximum
QALYs
Gained (n)
Achievable
QALYs
Gained (n)
Incentivised
QALYs gained
(n)
1 DM 18 c 40-85 45 374 8.31 15 4.1 3.5 3.0
2 CHD 12 c 40-90 50 872 17.44 13 4 3.5 3.1
3 BP 5 rct 40-70 30 7102 236.73 4 3.1 3.0 2.1 561 539 377
4 CHD 10 rct 40-60 20 872 43.60 27 2.9 2.1 1.3 427 311 187
5 Stroke 10 c 40-85 45 249 5.53 15 1.8 1.5 1.3
6 DM 20 rct 40-50 10 2118 211.80 10 1.7 1.5 0.8
7 CKD3 c 40-70 30 1371 45.70 11 1.7 1.5 1.1
8 COPD 8 c 40-85 45 748 16.62 13 1.6 1.4 1.2
9 CHD 9 rct 40-90 50 872 17.44 3 1.6 1.5 1.4 2 2 2
10 AF3 rct 40-90 50 1869 37.38 4 2.9 2.8 2.5 183 176 158
11 CHD 8 rct 40-70 30 2118 70.60 9 1 0.9 0.6
12 Stroke 12 rct 40-90 50 498 9.96 7 1 0.9 0.8 11 10 9
13 DM 12 c 40-60 20 2243 112.15 7 0.9 0.8 0.5
14 LVD 3 rct 40-80 40 1246 31.15 8 0.8 0.7 0.6 5 5 4
15 CHD 6 rct 40-70 30 2367 78.90 3 0.7 0.7 0.5
16 Smoking2 c 40-90 50 4361 87.22 1 0.7 0.7 0.6 14 14 12
18 DM 7 c 40-90 50 1371 27.42 5 0.4 0.4 0.3
20 DM 15 rct 40-80 40 374 9.35 6 0.2 0.2 0.2 17 16 13
24 CHD 11 rct 40-80 40 872 21.80 8 0.1 0.1 0.1 2 2 1
26 CKD4 c 40-80 40 498 12.45 9 234 216 173
27 CS1 c 40-80 40 1371 34.28 6 71 67 53
28 DM 21 c 40-90 50 623 12.46 7 115 107 96
All data for an average practice of 6411 patients, all figures rounded to whole numbers (except lives saved and marginal payment)
1 rct = randomised controlled trial, c = cohort.
2 % range of achievement between minimum and maximum payments
3 £ incentive gained for a 1% increase in performance within payment range.
4 E-reporting = exception reporting
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9of an indicator and the expected health gain at the per-
formance threshold for maximum payment measured in
lives saved or quality adjusted life years (Table 3). Our
sensitivity analyses, firstly using ‘maximum achievable
health gain’ rather than ‘incentivised health gain’ and
secondly using evidence for health gain only from ran-
domised controlled trials, did not substantially alter
these findings (Tables 3 & 4). Scatter plots presented in
Figures 1 and 2 show one outlier, treatment of hyper-
tension (label 3, indicator BP5). Reanalysis of the data
after excluding this outlier also shows no significant
associations. In summary no statistically significant asso-
ciations were found between any measure of health gain
and incentive gained in either the 2004 or 2006 version
of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We therefore
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship
between incentive pay and health gain for all areas in
both the 2004 and 2006 GMS contract.
Discussion
The principal finding of this research is that there is no
obvious relationship between the size of the financial
incentive and health gain for indicators with available
data on health gain in the 2004 or 2006 QOF for an aver-
age general practice. This is the case for both a marginal
improvement in performance of 1% and also for maxi-
mum levels of performance. Some interventions (such as
beta blockers in heart disease) receive a relatively low
incentive compared with their expected health gain,
whereas others (such as interventions for smoking cessa-
tion) receive a relatively high incentive compared with
their expected health gain. Although the incentives were
intended to reward general practice for both the volume
and quality of the work done [1], our findings suggest
that the incentives are not aligned with maximising
health outcomes, which is an explicit aim of the Depart-
ment of Health [2]. Many practices exceeded the thresh-
old for maximum incentive payments in clinical
indicators, and in these situations the GMS contract does
not reward further improvement in the quality of care.
Strengths and limitations
Strengths of this study include that robust and up-to-date
measures of health gain were used which were computed
specifically for the clinical indicators in the general prac-
tice contract, and included two different measures of
health gain. The estimates of health gain are quite robust
to measurement error, since all that is required for Spear-
man correlation tests in is that the estimates reflect the
rankings of interventions by size of health gain. Sensitiv-
ity analyses excluding trials with lower levels of evidence
and using maximum achievable health gain instead of
incentivised health gain, show similar results.
Limitations include that we were only able to identify
measures of health gain for a subset of 28 out of a total
of 98 indicators in the 2004 and 2006 QOF including an
additional area of cervical screening. However, these 28
are important indicators with measurable health out-
comes and are all considered clinically important inter-
ventions, which account for an achievable 1,085 QALYs
gained and 22 lives saved in one year for an average
sized practice, and yield 41% of the maximum possible
payment for clinical interventions. Of the clinical indica-
tors that were not included in this study, a further 27
were processes which were related to achievement of
these 28 indicators (additional file 1).
Table 3 Spearman correlations between measures of health gain and incentive payment
Measure of health gain Payment in 2004 QOF Payment in 2006 QOF
Primary analysis 1% improvement in achievable lives saved and incentive gained rho = 0.216
p = 0.334
n=2 2
rho = -0.026
p = 0.917
n=1 9
1% increase in achievable QALYs and incentive gained rho = 0.427
p = 0.252
n=9
rho = 0.368
p = 0.240
n=1 2
Secondary analysis Lives saved to target and maximum incentive payment rho = 0.183
p = 0.416
n=2 2
rho = -0.186
p = 0.446
n=1 9
QALYs gained to target and maximum incentive payment rho = 0.237
p = 0.539
n=9
rho = 0.183
p = 0.568
n=1 2
Sensitivity analysis 1 Maximum achievable lives saved and maximum incentive payment rho = 0.213
p = 0.342
n=2 2
rho = -0.087
p = 0.723
n=1 9
Maximum achievable QALYs gained and maximum incentive payment rho = 0.238
p = 0.537
n=9
rho = 0.184
p = 0.568
n=1 2
QOF = Quality and Outcomes Framework
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Page 6 of 9Not all QOF indicators may be mutually independent.
For example a practice which has a successful influenza
management system may be more likely to target all eli-
gible patients for immunisation irrespective of which
c h r o n i cd i s e a s et h e yh a v e .F u r t h e r m o r ei fap a t i e n th a s
co morbidities such as diabetes and heart disease which
include the same intervention, for example influenza
immunisation (CHD 12 and DM 18) or hypertension
control (CHD 6 and DM12), then there will be an inter
dependency between these indicators in different disease
domains. QOF interventions are selected by the NHS in
agreement with the BMA and in consultation with sta-
keholder groups. The actions of these agencies at the
primary care level may influence the priority that
primary care gives to certain medical conditions in a
number of ways in addition to inclusion in the QOF.
This research does not capture baseline performance,
so our analysis is limited to examining pay for the level
of performance, rather than for performance improve-
ment. Our estimates of marginal incentive for a one per-
cent point improvement in health gain are not affected
by this problem, so long as baseline performance is
below the target for maximum payment. We only con-
sidered the health benefits of the interventions in rela-
tion to the size of the QOF payments made. The costs
of the interventions themselves and their effect on other
health service costs have not been considered. Such
costs would have to be considered if we were to evaluate
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis 2, Spearman correlations between measures of health gain and incentive payment
Measure of health gain 2004 QOF
payment
(rcts only)
2006 QOF
payment
(rcts only)
2004 QOF payment
(without BP5)
2006 QOF payment
(without BP5)
1% improvement in achievable lives saved and
incentive gained
Rho = 0.058
p = 0.111
n=1 1
Rho = 0.058
p = 0.111
n=1 1
Rho = 0.137
p = 0.553
n=2 1
Rho = -0.147
p = 0.561
n=1 8
1% increase in achievable QALYs and incentive
gained
Rho = 0.450
p = 0.310
n=7
Rho = 0.611
p = 0.108
n=8
Rho = 0.180
p = 0.670
n=8
Rho = 0.178
p = 0.601
n=1 1
lives saved to target and maximum incentive
payment
Rho = 0.381
p = 0.247
n=1 1
Rho = 0.263
p = 0.434
n=1 1
Rho = 0.095
p = 0.683
n=2 1
Rho = -0.326
p = 0.186
n=1 8
QALYs gained to target and maximum incentive
payment
Rho = 0.148
p = 0.751
n=7
Rho = 0.366
p = 0.373
n=8
Rho = -0.098
p = 0.818
n=8
Rho = -0.064
p = 0.851
n=1 1
Maximum achievable lives saved and maximum
incentive payment
Rho = 0.428
p = 0.189
n=1 1
Rho = 0.412
p = 0.208
n=1 1
Rho = 0.130
p = 0.572
n=2 1
Rho = -0.223
p = 0.373
n=1 8
Maximum achievable QALYs gained and incentive
payment
Rho = 0.150
p = 0.749
n=7
Rho = 0.368
p = 0.370
n=8
Rho = -0.098
p = 0.817
n=8
Rho = -0.065
p = 0.851
n=1 1
Figure 1 Scatter plot of incentive gained and lives saved in
quality indicators, 2006 contract.
Figure 2 Scatter plot of incentive and QALYs gained from a
1% increase in performance, 2006 contract.
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Page 7 of 9the cost-effectiveness of the QOF. For example in
another study it was found that two of the indicators
considered actually reduced overall costs to the NHS
(CHD 10- aspirin in heart disease and DM 15- ACE
inhibitor drugs in diabetic renal disease) [21]. The net
health impact of cost saving interventions could be
higher than the average health impact we have esti-
mated, since the resources saved can be used elsewhere
for treating patients and delivering health gains. There
will be a small number of individual practices with aty-
pical populations where a closer national alignment of
QOF incentives and expected health gain does not fit
the health need for those particular practices. We have
made the assumption that health gains are distributed
evenly across all percentage increases in performance,
which may not be the case.
Comparison with previous research
Several studies have examined the expected health gain,
effectiveness and cost effectiveness of QOF, and one
examined the relationship between financial incentives
and health gain [12,14,18,21]. The findings of this small
study were similar to our study, finding no association
between the size of the financial incentive and expected
health gain [13].
Implications
The main implication for policy makers is that the lack
of an association between the size of the incentive and
the expected health gain may risk skewing activity
towards areas with high workload but relatively low ben-
efit to health [3]. Other areas which receive little or no
incentive may be relatively ignored [17,18]. Indications
for further research include a systematic review of inter-
ventions across the spectrum of primary care to identify
the evidence base in terms of QALYs to inform both
the selection of new indicators and the relative size of
financial incentives.
Conclusions
When designing pay for performance schemes the size
of achievable health gain to be expected from full imple-
mentation of an indicator should inform decisions both
about which indicators to add and remove from future
contract revisions, and about setting the relative size of
the financial incentives. Where data on the size of the
health gain for a clinical intervention do not exist, con-
sideration should be given to commissioning research to
produce the required information.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Full description of clinical indicators.
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